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Abstract
Conventional adversarial training methods using attacks
that manipulate the pixel value directly and individually,
leading to models that are less robust in face of spatial
transformation-based attacks. In this paper, we propose
a joint adversarial training method that incorporates both
spatial transformation-based and pixel-value based attacks
for improving model robustness. We introduce a spatial
transformation-based attack with an explicit notion of bud-
get and develop an algorithm for spatial attack generation.
We further integrate both pixel and spatial attacks into one
generation model and show how to leverage the complemen-
tary strengths of each other in training for improving the
overall model robustness. Extensive experimental results on
different benchmark datasets compared with state-of-the-art
methods verified the effectiveness of the proposed method.
1. Introduction
While breakthroughs have been made in many fields such
as image recognition leveraging deep neural networks, these
models could be easily fooled by the so call adversarial ex-
amples [30]. In terms of the image classification models, an
adversarial example for a given image is a modified version
that causes the classifier to produce a label different from the
original one while visually indistinguishable from it. Previ-
ous work mainly focused on improving the model robustness
to pixel value perturbations [9, 31, 22, 1]. In contrast, very
few work has been done on the model robustness w.r.t.spatial
transformations with some initial investigation in a few re-
cent works on adversarial attacks [8, 33]. While it has been
shown that certain spatial manipulations of images such as
rotation and translation [8] or non-rigid deformation [33]
can be used to generate adversarial examples for attacking
purpose, no practical approach has been developed yet on
how to incorporate the spatial domain into the adversarial
training framework to further improve the model robustness.
Part of the reason lies in the fact that current works [8, 33]
are mainly designed for attacking purpose, therefore the cost
function and the optimization algorithm therein might not
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Figure 1. Performance of conventional pixel attack-based ro-
bust model against spatial attacks. (a) the accuracy of a robust
model [22] under different spatial attack budgets ω using different
number of PGD steps. (b) spatial adversarial images with increas-
ing budgets on CIFAR10 using 20 PGD steps for the robust model.
be proper for robust training. For example, [8] used grid
search for the optimization of the transformation parameters
which is clearly limited to small parameter space and not
scalable. [33] proposed to generate adversarial examples by
smoothly deforming a benign image using a flow field. For
this purpose, the cost function used in [33] incorporates a
smoothness regularization term for the flow field to implic-
itly encourage the visual similarity. However, in order to get
reasonably good solutions, more expensive solvers need to
be used for minimizing the cost function [33]. Moreover, the
implicit penalty is not directly connected with a quantifiable
measure on the strength of the attack, which is important for
performing quantitative evaluations of model robustness and
benchmarking the performances of different algorithms. In
the following, we will use pixel attack to refer to the conven-
tional per-pixel additive attack and use spatial attack as a
shorthand for the spatial transformation-based attack.
In this paper, we present a joint spatial-pixel adversar-
ial training approach that improves model robustness. The
contributions of this paper are summarized as follows: (i)
we present a spatial attack approach with explicit budgets
and a practical first-order algorithm for spatial attack gener-
ation (as illustrated in Figure 1). The proposed setup could
serve as one of the first benchmark for evaluating model ro-
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bustness against spatial attacks; (ii) we present a framework
and concrete algorithms on how to jointly incorporate both
pixel and spatial domains for joint adversarial generation;
(iii) we develop a joint adversarial training approach that can
effectively leverage the joint attacks and improve the models
robustness w.r.t.pixel, spatial and joint attacks; the proposed
approach lead to models that achieve state-of-the-art perfor-
mance in terms of both pixel and spatial attacks.
2. Pixel Adversarial Training
We review briefly the standard adversarial training
method based on pixel attacks [9, 22], which improves model
robustness by solving the following minimax problem
min
θ
{E(x,y)∼D[max
x¯∈Sx
L(x¯, y;θ)]}, (1)
where x and y denote the original image and label sampled
from the dataset D, x¯ the adversarially perturbed image,
L(·) the loss function, θ the network parameter, and x the
perturbation budget. The feasible region Sx is defined as 1
Sx = {z | z ∈ B(x, x) ∩ [−1, 1]n},
whereB(x, x) = {z | ‖z−x‖∞ ≤ x} denotes the `∞-ball
with center x and radius x. In the single sample point case,
Eqn.(1) reduces to:
min
θ
[
max
x¯∈Sx
L(x¯, y;θ)]. (2)
The inner maximization can be approximately solved by
either a one-step approach such as the Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) [9], or a multi-step method such as the
multi-step projected gradient descent (PGD) [22]
xt+1 = PSx
(
xt + α · sign(∇xL(xt, y;θ))), (3)
where PSx(·) is a projection operator projecting the input
into the feasible region Sx. In the PGD approach, the estima-
tion is initialized as a random point within a neighborhood of
the original image x (i.e. B(x, x)), and then goes through
several PGD steps with a step size of α as shown in (3).
3. Spatial Attacks: Model and Algorithm
Most existing methods as reviewed in the previous sec-
tion are trying to manipulate the pixel value directly and
individually. While this ensures the most degrees of opera-
tional freedom, the resulting model is less robust in face of
spatial attacks [33, 8] as shown in Figure 1, possibly due to
the challenges brought by the excessive degrees of freedom
on finding the proper adversarial example for robust training.
It has been shown in [8] that simple rotation and translation
can be a form of naturally occuring adversarial attack. While
1Images are scaled to have pixel values in [-1, 1].
it is argued that simple translational and rotational trans-
formations are “semantic-preserving” operations, the trans-
formations are typically large enough to be noticeable [8].
[33] generates attacks by deforming a benign image with a
flow-based non-rigid transformation and uses a regulariza-
tion term to encourage smooth deformation of the images.
However, there is no direct constraints on the degrees of
deformations applied, which makes it less straightforward to
be connected with a quantifiable measure representing the
strength of the attack required for quantitative evaluation.
We instead pose an alternative question: can we achieve
effective spatial attack with an explicit budget constraint
such that the transformed images are visually indistinguish-
able from the original ones? We give positive answer to this
question and present the details in the sequel.
3.1. Spatial Transformation-based Attack Model
Given an original image x ∈ Rn, a spatially transformed
image can be represented as:
x˜ = T (x,ω), (4)
where T : Rn×Rn×2→Rn denotes a flow-parameterized
warping operator with ω ∈ Rn×2 denotes the flow filed. In
order to use back-propagation for optimization, a differen-
tiable warping is used [12]. While we are focusing on spatial
transformation in this work, this notion of transformation
is general and our work could potentially be generalized
to other forms of transformations al well. We leave the
investigation in this direction to future work.
For adversarial generation, we maximize the classification
loss L similar to the pixel case, but w.r.t.the flow field:
ω∗ = arg max
ω∈Sω
L(T (x,ω), y;θ). (5)
Then the spatial transformation-based adversarial attack can
be generated as x¯ = T (x,ω∗). Note that compared to
Eqn.(3), which edits pixel values individually and directly,
here we modify images through transformations thus impact-
ing pixel values in an implicit way.
3.2. Explicit Budget for Spatial Attack
It is important to have a quantitative budget for easy
benchmarking as in the pixel case [22], rather than indi-
rect measurement such as total smoothness [33]. Inspired by
many seminal works in pixel case [9, 31, 1, 22], where we di-
rect constrain the change of pixel values, we propose to bud-
get the spatial attacks in terms of the displacement amount.
More specially, given a vector field ω = [u,v] ∈ Rn×2,
where u∈Rn and v∈Rn denote the horizontal and vertical
components, we constrain the flow ω with an explicit spatial
budget ω as
ω∈Sω ≡ B(0, ω) , {ω | ‖ω‖2,∞ ≤ ω}. (6)
‖ · ‖2,∞ denotes the `2,∞-norm and is defined as follows for
a general matrix M ∈ Rn×k∥∥M∥∥
2,∞ ,
∥∥[‖m1‖2, · · · , ‖mi‖2, · · · ]T∥∥∞, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
where mi denotes the i-th row of M. Intuitively speaking,
Eqn.(6) implies that the permissible flow field cannot have
any flow vectors with a length that is larger than ω. This
notion of explicit budget is crucial for measuring the robust-
ness of different models, thus is one essential prerequisite
for designing algorithms on improving model robustness.
The relationship of varying test time spatial budget and the
accuracy of a robust model [22] on CIFAR10 is depicted in
Figure 1. We empirically observed that setting ω to one
percent the size of the image leads to a reasonable trade-off
between visual quality and attack effectiveness. For CIFAR
images of size 32×32, this implies ω≈0.3.
3.3. Generalized Gradient Sign Method
Towards the goal of robust training, an efficient algorithm
for solving Eqn.(5) is required before it can be integrated into
adversarial training. Some solutions such as grid search [8]
or L-BFGS method [33] are either less scalable or too expen-
sive thus are less appropriate for adversarial training. More
specifically, the non-parametric form of ω renders the grid
search method used in [8] impractical. And our goal of incor-
porating the generation into training pipeline also favors less
on more expensive methods. Along this line of reasoning,
we propose to solve Eqn.(5) using a first-order method:
ωt+1 = ωt + α · ∇ωL(T (x,ω), y;θ). (7)
To be efficient and effective, both FGSM and PGD
method need to incorporate the sign(·) operator for efficiency
in pixel attack. Here for the spatial attack, we would like to
have a similar mechanism. By viewing sign(·) as a scalar
normalization function, i.e., sign(x) = x‖x‖ , we can define a
“generalized sign” operator for vectors as:
−−→
sign([u, v]) =
[u, v]√
u2 + v2
. (8)
When
−−→
sign(·) takes a flow field ω as input, it operates on
each row vector separately. While the scalar sign(·) in the
pixel case normalized the scalar value and keeps the sign, the
vector
−−→
sign(·) normalized the vectors while retaining their
original directions.
We can now complete the Generalized Gradient Sign
method. Firstly, for spaital perturbation, we also need to start
with a random perturbation in the parameter space similar to
the pixel case in order to better explore the ω-ball around
the initial all-zero flow field. After obtaining the gradient
of the flow field as in Eqn.(7), we apply the vector
−−→
sign(·)
operator to the gradient, and then use it to take an ascend
Algorithm 1 Generalized Gradient Sign Method
Input: image x, loss L, step m, step size α, budget ω
Initialize flow ω0 ∼ B(0, ω)
for t = 1 tom do
− x¯ = T (x,ωt−1)
− ω¯t = ωt−1 + α · −−→sign(∇ωL(x¯, y;θ))
− ωt = PSω (ω¯t)
end for
Output: adversarial image T (x,ωm).
step scaled by a steps size α for updating the flow field. We
then project the flow updated with the gradient to the feasible
region Sω specified by the given budget. The full procedure
is summarized in Algorithm 1. Note that in the case of
multi-step PGD, it is important to accumulate the changes
in the transformation parameter ω as shown in Algorithm 1,
rather than applying transformations to a resulting image
accumulatively , which will lead to distorted blurry results
due to accumulated transformation errors.
3.4. The Effectiveness of First-Order Spatial Attack
Although the spatial attacks have much less degrees of
freedom compared with the pixel attacks, it can attack a
model trained with clean images effectively with a high
success rate (c.f. Table 1). Moreover, it can also attack a
pixel robustified models with high success rate. For exam-
ple, it can reduce the performance of a robust model trained
with the state-of-the-art method [22] effectively as shown in
Figure 1. It is observed from Figure 1 that even at a very
low budget range (e.g. ω≤0.5), the first-order attack can
significantly reduce the accuracy rate of a pixel-robustified
model [22] while maintaining a high resemblance of the orig-
inal image. Although this degree of resemblance decreases
when moving towards the high budget region (e.g. ω→1)
as there is no explicit smoothness penalty over the flow field,
the perturbed images still preserve the global structure thus
the major information [13]. Furthermore, we observe that
under a fixed budget, the proposed method can reduce the
accuracy of the robustified model significantly after a single
step and the the attacking strength increases with increased
number of PDG steps.
In summary, we have empirically observed the effective-
ness of the proposed first-order approach for generating spa-
tial attacks. Different from the observations in [8], we found
that the first-order optimization method is fairly effective
in generating adversarial spatial attacks. This enables us to
further utilize it for adversarial model training as detailed in
the next section.
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Figure 2. Computational graph for joint adversarial attack and
training. T denotes the spatial transformation operator while +
corresponds to pixel-wise additive attacks. For generating joint ad-
versarial attacks, instead of optimizing over x directly, we optimize
over ω, δ and then use them to generate the perturbed image.
4. Joint Adversarial Training
In order to jointly incorporate both spatial and pixel per-
turbations, we first present a re-parameterization of the ad-
versarial image in the pixel attack case as follows:
x¯ = x+ δ. (9)
Based on this re-parameterization, we can conventionally
switch from optimizing over x¯ as in Eqn.(1) to optimizing
over δ. While this is insignificant when considering pixel
attacks only, it facilities our derivation in the presence of
multiple attacks. Concretely, when incorporating both spatial
and pixel transformations, we have the following model for
joint spatial-pixel adversarial attack generation:
x¯ = T (x,ω) + δ. (10)
The corresponding computational graph is shown in Figure 2.
Based on this, we can generate the adversarial image by
optimizing over both ω and δ through a proper loss function
L. Given Eqn.(10), our formulation for the joint adversarial
training task is as follows:
min
θ
[
max
ω∈Sω,δ∈Sδ
L(T (x,ω) + δ, y;θ)]. (11)
The feasible region Sδ is defined as
Sδ = {δ | δ + T (x,ω) ∈ BT (x, x) ∩ [−1, 1]n},
where BT (x, x) = {z | ‖z − T (x,ω)‖∞ ≤ x}, which
essentially means the element z is in the ball when it is
close to the transformed clean image T (x,ω) in terms of
`∞-norm. The adversarial example is generated by solving
the inner problem of Eqn.(11) optimizing over both ω and δ.
We will present a practical algorithm for this in the sequel.
4.1. Joint Attack via Double-Pass Algorithm
To solve for the inner maximization problem of Eqn.(11),
we propose a double-pass algorithm for properly handling
the interactions between the two types of attacks. The de-
tailed algorithm for joint spatial-pixel adversarial attack gen-
eration is summarized in Algorithm 2. We start from random
points for both ω an δ in their respective -balls. In the first
Algorithm 2 Double-Pass Joint Adversarial Attack
Input: image x, label y, loss L, step m, step size α, β,
budget ω , x
Initialize ω0 ∼ B(0, ω), δ0 ∼ B(0, x)
for t = 1 tom do
− x¯ = T (x,ωt−1) + δt−1 // first-pass
− ω¯ = ωt−1 + α · −−→sign(∇ωL(x¯, y;θ))
− ωt = PSω (ω¯)
− x¯′ = T (x,ωt) + δt−1 // second-pass
− δ¯ = δt−1 + β · sign(∇δL(x¯′, y;θ))
− δt = PSδ (δ¯)
end for
Output: joint adversarial image T (x,ωm) + δm.
pass, we forward the clean image x through the adversar-
ial generation model Eqn.(10) with the current estimations
of ω and δ, obtaining the adversarial image x¯. Then the
gradient of the loss w.r.t.ω is computed based on x¯ and the
generalized gradient sign approach (Algorithm 1) is applied
for updating ω. In the second pass, we forward the clean
image again through the adversarial generation process with
the updated ω and perform a gradient update for δ based on
the gradient of the current loss w.r.t.it. This process can be
repeated for multiple steps and each step can be essentially
viewed as a variant of the alternating minimization approach
at instance level. The final adversarial image is generated as
T (x,ωm) + δm, where m denotes number of steps.
4.2. Practical Joint Adversarial Training
Training robust models that is resistant to both spatial and
pixel attacks boils down to solving a minimax problem as
in Eqn.(11). We approximately solve Eqn.(11) by replacing
the original clean training images with the joint adversarially
perturbed images obtained through the inner problem, and
then performing a conventional training of the model using
the perturbed images as done in conventional adversarial
training [9, 22].
The inner optimization problem corresponds to the at-
tack generation problem and we have presented a first-order
approach for joint attack generation in Section 4.1 as summa-
rized in Algorithm 2. In practice, we use a targeted approach
for generating the adversarial images. We replace the ground-
truth y with another label randomly sampled from the set
of labels excluding the correct one and flip the sign of the
gradient. A variant of label smoothing is also used [32]
for training. The complete procedure for joint adversarial
training is summarized in Algorithm 3.
Comments. We have empirically observed that the joint
attack is a type of attack that is stronger than either pure
pixel or spatial attacks, as shown in Table 1∼7. It can be ob-
served that the pixel robustified models are still vulnerable to
Algorithm 3 Joint Adversarial Training
Input: training epochs K, batch size N , learning rate ρ,
dataset D, budget ω , x,
for k = 1 toK do
for {xj , yj}Nj=1 from the first to last batch from D do
− generate target yˆj=rand unif({0, 1, · · ·}\{yj})
− generate jointly perturbed image batch {x¯j}Nj=1
according to Algo. 2 using targets {yˆj}
− get {y¯j} with y¯j = label smooth(yj)
− θ = θ − ρ · ( 1N
∑N
j=1∇θL(x¯j , y¯j ;θ))
end for
end for
Output: model parameter θ.
spatial attacks. This suggest that these two types attacks are
not entirely in the same space, thus offering complementary
strength to some extent. This is in line with the observation
of [8]. On the other hand, jointly considering both forms
of attacks can further improve the robustness of the model
compared with that of the model trained with only one type
of attacks. This implies that the two forms of attacks share
part of a common space where they can interact, which is
different from the observation in [8] that they are orthogonal
to each other. Our observation is reasonable and is aligned
with the fact that both are eventually impacting the pixel val-
ues, thus indeed sharing some common operational ground.
Finally, it is worthwhile to explain a few points about the
proposed double-pass algorithm. Firstly, it is different from
simply performing pixel adversarial after spatial perturba-
tion as two isolated pieces. Secondly, the straightforward
one-pass approach does not perform well potentially due to
the reason that it cannot handle the conflict of two types of
attacks properly. More discussions on these points, including
the order of the two types of attacks, will be elaborated in
the experiment section.
5. Discussions
We discuss the relationship of the proposed approach
with some previous related works to help understanding the
connections with the literature.
Pixel Adversarial Attacks and Defences. Model robust-
ness and adversarial examples have been investigated under
different contexts [6, 5]. Adversarial examples for CNN is
investigated in [30]. [10] proposed a efficient adversarial
attack generation approach called fast gradient sign method
(FGSM). Many efforts have been devoted in developing vari-
ants of attacks [25, 3]. Defense against adversarial attacks
has also emerged as an important topic and attracted many
attention [24, 23, 34, 11, 18, 28, 29, 27, 20, 32]. Adver-
sarial training [10, 16, 31, 22, 1] is one effective defence
method against adversarial attacks, It formulates the task
of robust training as a minimax problem, where the inner
maximization essentially generates attacks while the outer
minimization corresponds to minimizing the “adversarial
loss” induced by the inner attacks [22]. It typically uti-
lizes multiple steps for solving the inner problem in order to
achieve good performance, which makes the training process
time-consuming. [32] recently introduces a label adversarial
procedure for adversarial training which achieves state-of-
the-art performances with a single-step method, with the
incorporation of label perturbation based on a variant of
label smoothing, in addition to the conventional image per-
turbation.
Spatial Transformation and Adversarial Attacks. Spa-
tial transformation has been playing a crucial role in training
deep network models. It has been commonly used for aug-
menting the training data for training deep networks [15].
The spatial transformer network has been used to further
improve the invariance of the model w.r.t.spatial transforma-
tions of input images [12]. A few recent works investigated
the role of spatial transformation in attacks. [8] showed that
simple rotation and translation can perform attack effectively.
[33] used a flow field to deform a benign image smoothly to
generate attacks. We also use a flow field for spatial transfor-
mation. But instead of implicitly penalize for the flow filed as
done in [33], we propose to explicitly constrain the flow with
a budget. Furthermore, we develop a practical first-order
approach for efficient adversarial generation, which is more
practical compared to grid search [8] or L-BFGS [33].
Differentiable Renderer. The proposed joint adversarial
generation model resembles a standard image formation
process and can actually be regarded as an instance of differ-
entiable renderers [21, 17], which has been used for tackling
many tasks including image restoration [4], 3D shape es-
timation [21] and model-based reinforcement learning [2].
Recently a 3D model-based differentiable renderer has been
used for generating adversarial images [19]. Here we use
the generation model for joint spatial-pixel adversarial gen-
eration without the aid of 3D models. Still, this interesting
connection sheds lights on possible future directions.
6. Experiments
Our implementation is based on PyTorch2 and the code to
reproduce our results will be available on the project page.3
Extensive experiments are conducted on various datasets
including CIFAR10 [14], CIFAR100 [14] and SVHN [26].
We perform comparisons with several state-of-the-art adver-
sarial training methods, as well as a number of variants of
our proposed approach as detailed in the sequel.
2https://github.com/pytorch
3https://github.com/author/joint_adverse
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Figure 3. Robustness of different models at different pixel attack
levels (20 steps PGD) on CIFAR10. The vertical dashed lines
represent the budgets used during training. It is observed that the
proposed approach can improve its robustness w.r.t.both pixel and
spatial attacks compared to the state-of-the-art methods.
Baselines. We categorize all the methods to several cate-
gories according to the type of attack used during training.
For each category there are one-step and multi-step
variants apart from the standard training method:
• Natural: standard training using the original images.
• Pixel: pixel-based robust training methods.
multi-step variant corresponds to Madry method [22]
taking multiple PGD steps with random start. one-step
version corresponds to Bilateral method [32] using
gradient descend with targeted adversarial image
generation and a variant of label smoothing.
• Spatial: the approach that uses the proposed spatial
attacks (Algorithm 1) for model training.
• Joint: the proposed approach that leverages joint spatial
and pixel attacks robust training (Algorithm 3).
Test Time Attack. For robustness evaluation, we use pixel
budget x=8 and spatial budget ω=0.3. We used FGSM [9],
and multi-step PDGS [22] as two representative pixel-based
attack methods where S denotes the number of steps used.
We also use our developed Algorithm 1 as a spatial attack
method (denoted as “Spatial”), and the joint spatial-pixel
attack method presented in Algorithm 2 as a joint attack
method (denoted as “Joint”). FGSM used a step size of
8. All other attacks take 20 steps, with pixel step size of 2
and spatial step size of 0.15. To generate strong attacks for
evaluating robustness, we always use non-targeted attack,
and use random start for all methods except for FGSM.
Implementation Details. We use Wide ResNet (WRN-28-
10) [36] following [22]. For ω , we set it to be 1% of image
size, which corresponds to ω=0.3 pixel for CIFAR10, CI-
FAR100 and SVHN datasets. The initial learning rate is
0.1 for CIFAR and 0.01 for SVHN. We set the number of
epochs for all the multi-step methods as 100 with transition
epochs as {60, 90} as we empirically observed the perfor-
mance of the trained model stabilized before 100 epochs.
When incorporating spatial attacks, 300 epochs with transi-
tion epochs {100, 150} is used as we empirically observed
Models Acc.(%) Pristine Test Time Attack
FGSM PGD20 Spatial Joint
Natural 95.6 36.9 0.0 0.1 0.0
multi
step
Pixel 85.7 54.9 44.9 45.6 11.6
Spatial 91.0 57.0 18.7 70.8 13.4
Joint 76.4 55.8 50.4 60.2 29.6
one
step
Pixel 91.1 90.5 58.4 53.7 35.8
Spatial 94.1 73.2 35.8 65.7 30.5
Joint 92.1 88.7 64.0 68.0 53.1
Table 1. Accuracy of different models under different attacks on
CIFAR10. multi-step-Pixel corresponding to the Madry
methopd [22] and the one-step-Pixel corresponding to the
Bilateral method [32].
it helps with the model performance, possibly due to the
increased variations of data. The learning rate decay factor
is 0.1. Madry method [22] takes multi-step PGD with the
number of steps as 7 and step size as 2 to be compatible with
the literature [22]. For other multi-step methods, we use the
number of steps as 5, 0.1 for the spatial step size α and 2
for the pixel step size β for training. The transformation
operator is implemented as a differentiable bilinear warping
following [12].
6.1. CIFAR10
We conduct experiments on CIFAR10 [14] and compare
the performance of the proposed method with a number of
baseline methods in this section. CIFAR10 [14] is a popular
dataset that is widely use in adversarial training literature [22,
8, 32] with 10 classes, 5K training images per class and
10K test images. We perform standard data augmentation
including random crops with 4 pixels of padding and random
horizontal flips [14]. The results are summarized in Table 1.
We have several interesting observations: (i) pixel-
based robust models (multi-step-Pixel i.e. Madry [22],
one-step-Pixel i.e. Bilateral [32]) have certain level
of robustness to the spatial attacks, but are still less robust
to spatial attacks compared with the spatial robust models.
On the other hand, spatial robust models improve the robust-
ness w.r.t.to spatial attacks significantly, and also improve
the robustness w.r.t.pixel attacks at the same time, although
it is still lacked compared with pixel robust models. This
suggests that the pixel and spatial attacks neither work in
two totally independent spaces nor in a fully aligned space;
instead, they share a common subspace at least in part so that
they can contribute to improving robustness w.r.t.each other.
This contributes a complementary view to the one in [8] that
the two types of attacks (with a rigid spatial transformation)
seems orthogonal to each other. (ii) the proposed Joint ap-
proach can further improve the model robustness compared
with state-of-the-art methods, either under the multi-step
or single-step settings. For example, when trained with
Figure 4. Visualization of the flow field generated by the proposed approach. The images enclosed with red, green and black lines correspond
to the original image, perturbed image with proposed spatial attack and the corresponding flow field image.
Models Acc.(%) Pristine Test Time Attack
FGSM PGD20 Spatial Joint
Cascade 92.3 92.2 48.7 49.4 31.8
One-pass 91.8 95.5 32.6 44.9 23.8
Joint 92.1 88.7 64.0 68.0 53.1
Table 2. Comparison of different solutions integrating both spatial
and pixel attacks on CIFAR10 (x=8, ω=0.3).
one-step joint attacks (one-step-Joint), the model has
a level of robustness on-par or even better than the mod-
els specifically trained to be resistant to a particular type
of attacks (e.g., one-step-Pixel, one-step-Spatial).
The improvement is more pronounced when considering
evaluation with the joint spatial-pixel attacks, indicating
the effectiveness of the proposed method. We will use the
one-step variant for the proposed method in the following
experiments.
We further compare different models under different at-
tack levels (budgets) and the results are shown in Figure 3.
It can be observed that the Joint model trained with the
proposed approach outperforms other methods under both
pixel and spatial attacks. Moreover, it is also interesting to
note that although the model is trained under a fixed budget
(marked with a dashed vertical line), it generalizes to a range
of attacks with varying budgets reasonably well.
6.2. Comparison of Integration Approaches:
Cascade, One-Pass and Double-Pass
We investigate several variants of ways to integrate and
solve spatial and pixel attacks for robust model training.
(i) Cascade is a baseline approach that simply cascades spa-
tial and pixel attacks as two isolated modules. (ii) One-pass
is a baseline approach that uses a single forward-backward
pass for updating both the spatial transformation and pixel
additive values.
It can be seen from the results in Table 2 that neither
Cascade nor One-pass cannot fully leverage the spatial
and pixel attacks to improve the model robustness. In fact,
it is interesting to observe that the natural idea of naively
cascading two types of attacks cannot show clear gain and
sometimes compromises the robustness. Also, the straight-
forward one-pass approach does not work well, implying
the importance of handling the two types of attacks prop-
Model Acc.(%) Pristine
Test Time Attack
Pixel Spatial
Joint
Spatial-Pixel Pixel-Spatial
Joint-SP 92.1 64.0 68.0 53.1 48.5
Joint-PS 90.4 64.9 67.6 59.8 62.1
Table 3. The impact of spatial-pixel attack ordering of the proposed
method on model robustness on CIFAR10 (x=8, ω=0.3).
erly. Joint method with the double-pass algorithm can
effectively improve the model robustness and outperforms
Cascade and One-pass methods by a large margin.
6.3. The Ordering of Spatial and Pixel Attacks
While we have presented the joint adversarial training ap-
proach in a spatial-pixel attack ordering as in Eqn.(10). The
derivations are general and it is straightforward to be gen-
eralized to the pixel-spatial ordering. Here we experiment
with two variants of our proposed approach and investigate
the impacts of ordering on the model robustness. We use
Joint-SP and Joint-PS to denotes the models trained
following the proposed approach with spatial-pixel and pixel-
spatial ordering respectively. The results are reported in
Table 3. It is observed that models trained under different at-
tack orders might have slightly different performance under
a particular attack but overall deliver comparable robustness
performances. More details on this including the derivations
will be provided in the supplementary file.
6.4. The Impact of Training Budgets
We investigate the impacts of training budgets in this sec-
tion and the results are summarized in Table 4. It is observed
that the performance of the proposed method is relatively
stable w.r.t.the variations of budgets, and it seems to be ben-
eficial to use smaller budgets for training. For example, our
model achieves the best result (68.7% under PGD20 on CI-
FAR10) with x= 2 and ω=0.1. The purpose of this set
of experiments is to show that different training budgets do
have different impacts on the final model robustness. How-
ever we do not aim to select the best performing model by
grid-searching over the combinations of training budgets and
we will use a training budgets the same as the test budgets
by default in the following experiments while bearing in
mind that the numbers for model robustness could be further
Train
Budgets
Pixel x 2 4 6 8
Spatial ω 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3
Test Time
Attack
Pristine 92.2 90.5 90.2 91.3 89.1 88.0 90.1 88.7 87.3 94.2 92.5 92.1
PDG20 68.7 65.9 61.6 65.4 61.4 57.8 64.5 59.2 57.5 65.2 62.3 64.0
PDG100 67.5 65.3 60.3 64.7 60.7 57.0 64.0 58.5 57.1 54.4 50.2 52.7
Spatial 68.0 67.5 67.2 64.0 64.0 63.2 62.7 61.4 61.7 68.0 69.1 68.0
Joint 61.53 62.8 57.3 59.4 57.1 53.6 58.8 54.0 53.5 46.4 46.7 53.1
Table 4. Evaluation accuracy of models trained with the proposed Joint method under different training budgets (x, ω) on CIFAR10.
increased by tuning them. What is the most appropriate
training budgets and how to determine it is an open problem
and worth to be investigated in the future work.
Black-box Attack FGSM PDG20 Spatial Joint
Attack Gen.
Model
Undefended 88.7 90.7 90.4 90.5
Siamese 88.7 82.4 85.2 79.8
Table 5. Accuracy of the Joint approach under black-box attack
on CIFAR10 dataset. Model used for black-box attacks (Attack
Gen. Model): “Undefended”-the model trained with clean images,
“Siamese” another model trained with the Joint approach.
6.5. Black-box Attack
To further evaluate the robustness of the proposed Joint
approach w.r.t.black-box attacks, we conduct experiments us-
ing undefended model and a jointly trained model in another
training session for generating test time attacks. The results
are presented in Table 5. As demonstrated by the results, the
model trained with the Joint approach is robust against
various of black-box attacks, verifying that a non-degenerate
solution is learned [31].
6.6. CIFAR100
We evaluate the models against white-box attacks on
CIFAR100 dataset and with 100 classes, 50K training and
10K test images [14]. As shown by the results in Table 6, the
proposed approach can effectively increase the robustness
of the model w.r.t.spatial attack and joint attack as observed
for CIFAR10. Also, it helps to boost the model robustness
w.r.t.pixel attacks as well, which is well-aligned with the
analysis in previous sections, that both forms of attacks have
some complementary strength that can contribute to improve
the model robustness w.r.t.each other.
Models Acc.(%) Pristine Test Time Attack
FGSM PGD20 Spatial Joint
Natural 79.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Madry 59.9 28.5 22.6 24.6 4.8
Bilateral 72.6 60.8 25.4 23.6 14.5
Joint 68.6 63.2 28.8 28.6 26.6
Table 6. Accuracy of different models under different attacks on
CIFAR100 dataset (x=8, ω=0.3).
6.7. SVHN Dataset
We further report results on the SVHN dataset [26].
SVHN is a 10-way house number classification dataset, with
73257 training images and 26032 test images. The additional
training images are not used in experiment. The results are
summarized in Table 7. The performance of the proposed ap-
proach compares favorably with the models trained with [22]
and [32]. More concretely, the proposed method outperforms
all other methods under variants of pixel-based attacks (e.g.
FGSM, PGD), spatial attack as well as joint attack, indicat-
ing that the integration of spatial with pixel attacks can not
only improve model robustness against spatial attacks, which
is lacking in the conventional models, but also boost the ro-
bustness against pixel attacks, for which the conventional
models are specially designed for. This further demonstrates
the benefits of the proposed joint training approach.
Models Acc.(%) Pristine Test Time Attack
FGSM PGD20 Spatial Joint
Natural 97.2 53.0 0.3 7.3 0.0
Madry 93.9 68.4 47.9 76.7 19.7
Bilateral 96.8 89.7 55.1 75.5 35.0
Joint 96.2 91.5 56.4 79.1 38.8
Table 7. Accuracy of different models under different attacks on
SVHN dataset (x=8, ω=0.3).
7. Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented a joint adversarial training approach
in this paper. Motivated by the goal of improving model
robustness, we developed a spatial transformation-based at-
tack method with explicit budget constraint, and presented
an effective approach for joint adversarial attack genera-
tion and training incorporating both spatial and pixel at-
tacks. Extensive experiments on various datasets includ-
ing CIFAR10, CIFAR100 and SVHN with comparison to
state-of-the-art methods [22, 32] verified the efficacy of the
proposed method. For future work, it is interesting to investi-
gate how to further generalize the proposed approach to more
general transformation, by leveraging more advanced differ-
entiable renderers [21, 17, 19]. While the current work and
many other existing works focused on small scale datasets, it
would be interesting to perform large scale joint adversarial
training on ImageNet [7] following [16, 31, 35].
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